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The rise of the new single issue groups has presented the Republican and 
Democratic parties with a novel challenge to their historic roles as broad- 
based coalition parties. Both parties now confront groups within their 
ranks that demand o f party nominees a strict commitment to the position 
held by the group on a specified issue. We will examine the extent to 
which party delegates who are active in the new issue groups are distin­
guished from other delegates in their party commitment, issue positions, 
and ideological orientation. In short, have state party conventions been 
penetrated by new issue group activists, lacking any broader interest in or 
commitment to the party? We draw two conclusions from our analysis 
below: First, delegates in new issue groups are also active in other interest 
groups within their respective parties. This suggests that while delegates 
may belong to single issue groups, they may not have single issue political 
orientations. Second, delegates active in newer social issue groups can be 
distinguished from other delegates within their respective parties on 
certain measures of commitment, but nonetheless such delegates are 
clearly differentiated in their party orientation from delegates in the other 
party who are active in similar interest groups.
The two main American political parties, o f course, are legally obli­
gated to maintain open memberships and to maximize participation in the 
nominating process (Ranney 1975, 1978). Over the years both parties 
have come to enjoy the status o f semistate agencies— that is, both the 
judicial and legislative branches have recognized that parties perform a 
critical role in the selection of the nation’s leadership (Francis and Warr 
1980). In return for this recognition, the parties have been obliged to 
remain relatively open to a large array of individuals and groups who opt 
to participate in the nominating process of either or both parties.
Over most of this century, economic issues have generated the princi­
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pal cleavages between Republicans and Democrats (Sundquist 1972; 
Burnham and Chambers 1975). Well-established business and labor 
groups have long played important roles (albeit at sharply different levels) 
in both parties. In the past two decades, however, new issues have become 
salient— issues that are social and/or moral in nature. Along with the 
older established groups, issue groups such as the anti-abortionists, 
women's rights advocates, and environmentalists have sought to play 
important roles in American party politics.
There is some concern that the new social issue groups are inimical to 
the traditional conception of American parties (Commager 1980; Sam- 
uelson 1979). The new groups, it is argued, for the most part are com ­
mitted to a very limited set of issues, have little interest in the broader 
range of concerns that make up national political parties, and are only 
willing to judge candidates or parties on the issue stance of concern to the 
group.1 (Vinovskis 1979; Keller 1980; Crotty and Jacobson 1980; 
Weintraub 1980). In contrast, the older established economic groups such 
as labor or business are experienced in dealing with a range of diverse 
issues and have developed the art of compromise in working within the 
broad coalitions that are the two main political parties.
It might be presumed that the rise of a new issue group would have an 
equal chance of acceptance or rejection by each party in a two-party 
competitive system. But few issues are received with equal interest by the 
respective parties, nor is a new issue completely rejected by one party and 
fully accepted by the other. A party’s commitment to a new issue area is, 
in part, dependent on the constellation of forces within the existing two 
parties. It may well be that a new social issue group in its relationship to 
the parties is quite similar to older, established groups when they started 
out; that is, an initial neutrality toward the system is followed by a 
gradually greater identification with one party rather than the other. An 
illustration is the environmentalist movement. When the environmen­
talists emerged as a major force in the late 1960s, they adopted a stance of 
strict party neutrality. Environmentalist issues were widely perceived as 
consumer issues requiring strong federal regulatory solutions. This per­
ception of the problem made environmentalist concern understandable 
and appealing to many groups within the Democratic party who them­
selves favored strengthened federal regulatory intervention. It is in­
creasingly apparent in the early 1980s that many environmentalist groups 
have decided to actively involve themselves in the Democratic party. Thus
members in a new issue group are likely to be in the process of sorting out 
their group’s relationship to the two main parties.
Of course, it is likely that political activists may belong to more than 
one interest group. Indeed, one way a new interest group may stand apart 
from, or be a part of, the broader coalitions that make up the two parties is 
the extent to which its members are also active in other groups. If, for 
example, activists in one group are also active in other organizations, then 
there is a greater chance they will share understanding of the various 
groups’ concerns (Verba and Nie 1971). On the other hand, if the 
delegates who are active in one group are not noticeably active in any 
other groups, then the prospects for isolation from the party coalition are 
greater. We discuss below patterns of plural interest group membership 
and the implication for coalition-building within each party.
We examine three sets o f questions concerning the relationships be­
tween interest groups and their political parties. First, what differences 
exist in terms of levels of support for the party among those who belong to 
an old or a new issue group? For example, are the activists in the new 
single issue groups less supportive of their political party than delegates 
who are not members of such groups? Second, what variations are evident 
in the issue positions of members of old or new groups? Would there be 
substantive differences between the issue positions of activists in a new 
single issue group and activists in the established economic groups? 
Finally, what is the extent of shared ideological orientation among mem­
bers of the old or new groups? From answers to these questions we draw 
some tentative conclusions about the extent to which delegates with 
memberships in several groups enhance the integrative abilities of the 
political parties.
We test the following hypotheses in the exploration of activists’ at­
titudes to their respective political parties:
Party support: Delegates who are active in new interest groups will be less 
likely to be supportive of the party than are delegates in the established 
economic interest groups.
Ideological Orientation: Delegates who are members of a new issue 
group will be ideologically distinct from other delegates at the conven­
tion.
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Issue Orientation: Delegates who are active in new issue organizations 
will be distinct from other delegates at the convention on particular issue 
positions.
It is precisely because American political parties are so closely identi­
fied with the electoral system that a single issue group— indeed, any 
group wishing to influence the course of American politics— finds it less 
costly to devote some of its efforts to working within either or both parties. 
However, as the first hypothesis predicts, large numbers of delegates at a 
party convention who belong to a single issue group would increase the 
probability of greater fragmentation within the party. Less consensus on 
issues or candidates and less commitment to the party as an organization 
deserving of support in its own right would be expected. It is fairly 
apparent, for example, that a number of single issue groups have been 
increasingly active in the Democratic party in the past two decades. In one 
of the few empirical studies dealing with this subject Jeane Kirkpatrick 
surveyed delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. The 
“interest group specialists,” that is delegates who focused activity almost 
exclusively on the new social interest groups, were notable for their 
political style combining “high policy concern with little or no interest in 
party preservation or solidarity” (Kirkpatrick 1976; Polsby 1981). The 
first hypothesis, based upon the Kirkpatrick findings, predicts that the 
Democrats would be a party of policy divisions, that is, a party composed 
of a number of autonomous groups.
Moreover, the longer a group has enjoyed an association with a 
political party, the greater may be that group’s strength of identification 
with that party. The economic groups have had, for the most part, long 
records of association with the two parties. What we are proposing is that 
there is a parallel between individual level socialization and party mem­
bership and group level socialization and party orientation. Some obser­
vers have stipulated that the longer an activist remains in the political 
party the greater the likelihood that there will be a shift in incentives 
(Wilson 1973, chapter 6). Initially some activists are activated by ide­
ological considerations, but over time solidary and tangible rewards come 
to play larger parts in inducing activists to remain with a party (Roback 
1980; Moe 1981, 1980). We suggest that interest groups’ members also 
change in their orientation to the party over time. Group members come to 
establish social and political relationships with other activists in the party.
102 Groups and Representation
A network of relationships develops that socializes the new group mem­
bers into a sympathetic appreciation of the problems of an electoral 
organization and its need to come up with viable candidates and issues 
capable of creating winning electoral coalitions (Kirkpatrick 1976). In 
turn, the party over time becomes more attuned to the demands of the 
group.
As grounding for the second hypothesis, we note that the new issue 
groups are likely to attract individuals of diverse backgrounds who are 
united only on the issue position held by the group (Kirkpatrick 1976, 
224). These activists may come to the party from a range of ideological 
backgrounds, ln contrast, party activists who are members of the older 
established economic groups or who are not active in groups at all are 
more likely to share broadly similar ideological orientations. Our data 
suggest that in terms of self-placement the Democrats are more likely to 
be found to the center-left while Republicans are to the center-right.
Finally, the third hypothesis is built on the assumption that the issues 
that confront social interest groups may be less susceptible to compromise 
than economic interests since they are more frequently presented in moral 
terms. For example, environmentalists may see the preservation of the 
public lands as a goal of incalculable value, of an order different from the 
bargaining and negotiation that takes place between business and labor 
groups. Similarly, if the anti-abortionists wish to secure the nomination 
and election of candidates who share the group’s position on abortion, 
then group members would become politically active in the Democratic 
and Republican parties. If abortion is the only issue of concern to group 
members, then it is probable that no real pattern of issue compatibility 
will exist between delegate members of the anti-abortionist group and 
other delegates at the convention.
As described in the introductory chapter, the activists surveyed come 
largely from states located in the South and West. In most of these states 
political conventions are meaningful political activities. In these ide­
ologically conservative regions the Republican party has enjoyed growing 
electoral success. Many of these states have seen major controversies 
during the last decade over such new issues as the environment, the Equal 
Rights Amendment, and abortion.
For the purposes of our analysis we examined the responses of dele­
gates by party but not by state. Our justification for treating the eleven 
states as a whole is that it permitted us to explore the attitudes of delegates
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in a range of groups. If we had engaged in a state-by-state analysis, certain 
groups simply lacked sufficient representation in the Republican party to 
allow us to perform our analysis. By massing the delegates by party we 
were able to explore all groups in both political parties. We created two 
delegate subgroupings. The first is composed of delegates who are 
politically active in the new issue groups. We identified four such groups: 
opponents of abortion, advocates of women’s rights, environmentalists, 
and civil rights activists. The last group, civil rights activists, presents 
some problems in classification. The civil rights groups may be il­
lustrative of groups in transition. That is, they have a long record of 
association with the main political parties, principally the Democratic 
party, and have come to embrace a range of issues, many of which are 
economic in focus.
Our second category is composed of delegates who report that they are 
active in the traditional economic interest groups. We identified three 
such groups: labor unions, business organizations, and farm associations. 
We discuss educational groups as well as traditional economic groups, 
although we recognize that the category embraces both professional and 
civic-minded organizations. These econom ic groups, particularly labor 
in the Democratic party and business in the Republican party, have been 
important components of the national parties for the past fifty years.
Our analysis relies on what delegates themselves tell us about their 
political activities. Indicators of strength of partisan identification, degree 
of party support, campaign activity and ideological placement are all self­
reported. We recognize that there may be a good deal of variance to the 
delegates’ reports of their activity in various interest groups. Such activity 
could be interpreted as attendance at meetings or it could suggest that the 
delegate holds an active leadership role in the group. We also recognize 
that delegates were asked to respond to group categories rather than to 
particular groups such as, say, the Sierra Club. Categories such as 
conservation, ecology groups, woman’s rights groups, or civil rights 
groups can embrace a variety of organizational possibilities.
With one exception, the data do not support our hypotheses. It does 
appear that social issue group delegates, particularly in the Democratic 
party, are less supportive of their party than are delegates who are not 
politically active in social issue groups. But single issue group delegates 
are not lacking in ideological relevance to their respective parties, al­
though they may fall to one side of the party’s ideological spectrum. Nor
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Table 6 .1 . Delegates reporting interest group activity (percent)
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are they divorced from the issue positions of their fellow delegates. We 
thus must reject the hypotheses predicting issue divergence and lack of 
ideological congruence between activists in the newer interest groups and 
their parties.
On the question of group membership, in Table 6.1 over 60 percent of all 
delegates surveyed claim to be active in groups outside their respective 
parties.
No one will be surprised to learn that interest groups do not enjoy equal 
representation in both parties. Democrats are involved in a widen more 
diversified range of groups than the nearly 28 percent of the delegates 
professing activity in educational organizations; by contrast, Republican 
educationists come in at just under 15 percent. Some 18 percent of 
Democratic delegates identify themselves as labor activists— six times 
the representation of labor activists among Republicans. Just over half of 
all Republican delegates are active in either business (28.5 percent) or 
professional (23.5 percent) organizations— by far the largest groupings of 
Republican activists— but some 23 percent of Democrats identify them­
selves as involved in professional organizations, and 15 percent claim 
activity in business organizations. Farm organizations claim relatively
PATTERNS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP
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18.2 346 9.0 172
16.8 269 8.6 137
22.4 307 11.8 161






union 15.6 297 11.8 224 26.6 506 21.6 412
Business
organization 18.5 297 20.6 331 26.6 427 17.9 288
Farm
organization 16.4 224 24.2 331 32.7 447 15.7 214
Educational
organization 17.2 506 14.5 427 15.2 447 25.7 757
Women’s rights
group 21.3 412 14.8 288 11.0 214 39.1 757
Ecology group 21.4 346 16.6 269 18.9 307 34.8 564 40.0 648
Anti-abortion
group 27.3 172 21.8 137 25.6 161 31.6 199 22.3 140 170
Note: Entries are percentages of groups reporting membership in other groups. For example, 15.6% of 
union members were in business organizations.
similar levels of involvement from delegates in both parties, 12.5 percent 
among Democrats and 13.3 percent among Republicans.
In the area of social issues, the events of the past twenty years have had 
more impact on group activities of Democratic delegates than on ac­
tivities o f Republican delegates, with one major exception, the abortion 
issue. Just under one-fifth of the Democrats report political activity in 
civil rights groups. Over 18 percent are active in women's rights groups. 
Somewhat below 16 percent are in the environmentalist movement. Such 
issue groups clearly constitute major forces in Democratic state conven­
tions.
By contrast, the Republicans contain many fewer activists from these 
social issue groups. Just over 2 percent of Republican delegates are active 
in civil rights groups. Women’s rights supporters constitute somewhat 
over 4 percent of the delegates. Next to the anti-abortionists, the environ­
mentalists are the largest social group at nearly 8 percent. Significantly, 
the only issue category represented in double digits for the Republicans is 
the anti-abortion movement, which includes just over 10 percent of 
Republican delegates. In contrast, just under 6 percent of the Democrats 
report political activity in anti-abortion groups. This finding is surprising, 
for studies of the anti-abortion movement have described it as being 
successful in recruiting blue-collar Catholics, a group historically within 
the Democratic tradition. In another sense, however, the anti-abortionists 
are clearly conservative in their reaction against a change in social 
practice that was triggered by the Supreme Court decision legalizing 
abortion in Roe vs. Wade.
In analyzing the relationships between interest group activists and 
their parties, it must also be borne in mind that delegates who are active in 
one interest group tend to be active in others as well. In Tables 6 .2  and 6.3 
the pattern of plural or overlapping group membership is apparent in both 
the Republican and Democratic conventions. Read horizontally, the tables 
show the percent of activists o f one type— for example, labor union 
activists— active in groups of other types such as business or farm 
organizations. In order to obviate the danger of overreporting, the catego­
ries selected in Tables 6 .2  and 6.3 are ones that are less likely to have been 
confused with each other by the delegates. For example, the category of 
“civil rights groups” is not included in the analysis of overlapping group 
membership because members of women’s rights groups might quite 
naturally have reported themselves as members of civil rights groups as 
well.
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28.7 87 14.9 45 24.5 74
16.6 479 12.3 354
34.2 479 20.0 2.80
23.3 354 18.4 280
27.3 122 14.5 65 31.7 142
35.6 292 28.2 232 23.1 190
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In both parties, interest groups that attract the membership of large 
numbers of delegates appear to have a commanding position in serving as 
the center of a network of common issue concerns. A useful i llustration is 
delegate membership in educational organizations in the Democratic 
party. In Table 6.2 between 26.6 percent and 39.1 percent of delegates in 
the other selected group categories also claim to be activists in educa­
tional organizations. This network of membership means that certain 
issues and interests in the area of education are likely to attract considera­
ble attention among delegates at the several Democratic state conven­
tions. In contrast, the network of the anti-abortionist groups among 
Democratic delegates is much more restricted. Only 6 percent of Dem o­
cratic delegates claim to be active in anti-abortionist organizations. Those 
delegates are, themselves, active in many other interest groups. But their 
voice in the other organizations is not numerically strong, certainly in 
comparison to the educationists. The percentage of activists in the other 
types of organizations who are also active members of anti-abortionist 
organizations range from only 6.7 to 11.8 percent.
In the case of the Republican delegates, a different pattern of overlap­
ping membership emerges. Active membership in business organizations 
appears to be the focal point for Republican delegates. In Table 6.3 
between one-quarter and one-third of Republican delegates claiming to be 
active in the other selected groupings claim to be active in business 
organizations as well. The greater strength of the anti-abortionists in the 
Republican party is apparent as well in the pattern of overlapping mem­
bership. Between 11 and 24.7 percent of delegates claiming to be active in 
the other six groupings also claim activity in anti-abortion groups.
Of course, group membership is not necessarily equated with a specif­
ic issue central to the group leading the delegates to participate in the 1980 
election campaign. Nonetheless, single issues apparently are an impor­
tant source of motivation. Just under half of all Democratic delegates 
(48.2 percent) and nearly 60 percent of all Republican delegates (58.8 
percent) claim that a single issue caused them to become involved in the 
1980 campaign. An analysis of the issues by area, however, reveals that 
social issues are not the central motivators of delegates’ participation in 
the 1980 elections. In Table 6 .4 , although the category of morality and 
conduct includes such issues as abortion and women’s rights, overall the 
category attracted only 10 percent of delegates in both parties. The 
economy and government were the principal motivators of active par­
ticipation in the 1980 elections.
Issue Group Activists 109
110 Groups and Representation
Table 6.4 . Issues motivating delegates to join the 1980 campaign 
(percent)
Democrats Republicans
Economic issues 21.3 33.0
Social welfare 9.1 ; 2 .8  <
Energy 6.9 2.5
Morality and conduct 11.2 10.4
Race 0.9 0
Defense ' 3 ' 3.2 • 6.2
Government 26.1 28.2
Foreign relations - 3.6 4.5
No issue 17.7 12.4 -
100.0 100.0
If we turn to specific groups of delegates active in social issue groups, 
it is quite apparent that such groups are not composed of delegates 
motivated solely by the issue that is presumably central to the group’s 
concern. Among Democrats active in women's rights groups, 62.8 per­
cent claim to be participating in the 1980 election because of a specific 
issue, but only 18.9 percent of those delegates state that it is the women’s 
rights issue. A similar pattern is found for Democrats active in anti­
abortion groups: while 60.4 percent of such delegates claim to have 
become active in the election because of a specific issue, only 20 percent 
identify it as the abortion issue per se. A similar pattern holds for the 
Republican delegates. Republican activists in women’s rights groups and 
anti-abortion groups claim by 62.3 percent and 66.4 percent respectively 
to have become active in 1980 in response to a specific issue. However, 
only 18.3 percent and 15.6 percent of the two groups of issue-motivated 
delegates attribute their activity to the women’s rights or abortion issues 
respectively .
PARTY SUPPORT AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP
The heart of our concern is the extent to which delegates who are 
politically active in the new single issue groups are less party oriented than 
delegates in the more traditional economic or occupational organizations. 
Table 6.5 does reveal that delegates to both sets o f state conventions are
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Table 6.5 . Delegates expressing strong partisan identification
Democrats % Republicans %
Economic groups
Labor unions ■ 81.5 (1406) 73.0 (197)
Business organizations 72.1 (1060) 79.1 (2342)
Professional organizations 74.5 (1615) : 86.0 (1954)
Educational organizations 72.8 (1906) 79.1 (1097)
Farm organizations . 75.9 (895) 88.2 (1281)
Social groups
Civil rights groups 77.0 (1417) 66.4 (204)
Environmentalists ... 6 8 .7 (1015) 82.5 (612)
Women’s rights groups 75.1 (1313) — 70.6 (287)
Anti-abortionist groups 69.0 (382) 81 .2 (837)
All delegates 72.1 (6763) 84.5 (8136)
strong party identifiers. Republicans more so than Democrats express a 
strong sense of party affiliation; the figures are 80 percent and 70 percent 
respectively.
An examination of the groups in which Democratic delegates are 
active indicates that labor union activists, women’s rights supporters, and 
civil rights group activists are among the strongest Democratic party 
identifiers. Labor union delegates lead all other groups in the strength of  
their identification, 81.5 percent. In contrast, the average for the party is
72.1 percent. The only two groups that fall below the party average are the 
environmentalists (68.7 percent) and the anti-abortionists (69 .0  percent). 
All of the economic groups are either at the party average or just above.
in the Democratic party we found that delegates who are active in 
labor, civil rights, and women’s rights groups are supportive of their party 
to an extent that is not apparent among Republican delegates active in 
those same groups. Republican activists supporting labor, civil rights, and 
women's groups are some ten percentage points below their fellow Repub­
licans in expressing strong partisan affiliation. In contrast, Republican 
environmentalist and anti-abortionist activists are at 82.5 percent and
81.2 percent, just about the party average, in expressing a strong sense of  
identification. Business, professional, and farm groups are the three most 
strongly partisan of all the Republican groups.
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Table 6.6. Support for party as motive for attending convention
Democrats % Republicans %
Economic groups
Labor unions 70.6 (1300) , 56.4 (170)
Business organizations 68.6 (1067) 67.8 (1893)
Professional organizations 62.9 (1460) 64.5 (1538)
Educational organizations 58.9 (1664) . 61.3 (906)
Farm organizations 68.5 (885) 70.6 (950)
Social groups
Civil rights groups > 5 9 .5 (1185) 54.5 (123)
Environmentalists ^ 51.5 (799) 63.5 (505)
Women’s rights groups 60.4 (1123) 59.9 (254)
Anti-abortionist groups 60.9 (363) 56.6 (617) -
All delegates 61.9 (6281) 66.6 (6765)
Table 6.5 indicates that delegate groupings that are both large and 
influential within the party are more likely to contain strong party identi­
fiers than groups with less successful records and smaller numbers of 
adherents in the party. Women’s rights activists and labor unionists, for 
example, have not enjoyed much success in Republican state parties. In 
contrast, such groups have been important components of the Democratic 
party.
Reported strength of party affiliation is one measure of party commit­
ment.2 Another indicator that is more to the point in an analysis of the 
impact of interest group membership upon importance of party support is 
the motivation to attend caucuses. In Table 6.6, we see that Republicans 
are more inclined to believe that supporting the party was an important 
motivation than are Democrats. In the Democratic party, traditional 
economic groupings are more likely than newer social issue groups to 
emphasize support for the party. Both labor and business groups are over 9 
and 8 percent higher, respectively, in assessing the importance of party 
support than the party delegates in general. In contrast, civil rights, 
women’s rights and anti-abortionist groups are close to the party average. 
Environmentalists were much less motivated to participate by support for 
the party, falling 10 points below. In some sense the environmentalists are 
the least party-oriented of the Democratic groups; their group behavior
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most conforms to the prediction that single issue groups are not highly 
supportive of the party.
For the Republicans in Table 6.6, the pattern that was observed in 
regard to party affiliation by group activists is also apparent on the 
question of support for the party. Traditional economic groups are more 
likely to emphasize support for the party than are social issue groups. The 
single exception to this division between social and economic issues is 
Republican labor activists. Along with civil rights activists, they remain 
noticeably less motivated by support for their party. Republican anti­
abortionists are next weakest in party motivation, remaining 10 percent 
below the average for Republican delegates.
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide some confirmation of our first hypothesis 
that social issue groups are less motivated by support for their respective 
political parties than are delegates in economic groups. Presumably, 
commitment to social issue groups can and does draw support away from 
the party. But any account of conflicting loyalties between group and party 
must be seen in the larger context of the success enjoyed by the group in 
the two parties. The more influential the interest group, the more its 
delegates were motivated by party loyalty.
IDEOLOGY AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP
In testing our second hypothesis—that is, the extent to which single issue 
group delegates are actually ideologically sympathetic to the party in 
which they are located—we examined the ideological self-placement of 
delegates in each party. The range for Republicans was from somewhat 
liberal, middle of the road, and somewhat conservative to very conserva­
tive. Democrats ranged from somewhat conservative to very liberal.
A survey of Table 6.7 shows three distinct ideological locations for the 
interest groups we have examined in the Democratic party. Economic 
organizations are skewed to the left of center. Among these groups, labor 
union activist delegates are the most liberal, while farm and business 
groups are the least liberal. The social issue groups, with the important 
exception of the anti-abortionists, are to the left of the economic groups 
and are therefore a strong liberal presence in the party conventions. There 
is a remarkable degree of ideological similarity among the women’s rights 
groups, the civil rights activists, and the environmentalists. Members of 
each of these groups who claim to be middle of the road or somewhat
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All Democrats 19.1 (1935) 39.4 (3987) 22.1 (2240) 19.4 (1970)
Note: Percentages are row percentages.
conservative do not exceed 25 percent. In contrast, among the Democratic 
economic groups, “right wings” range between 35 and 55 percent of their 
members.
The Democratic social issue groups appear in large part to be the left 
wing of the party. Their delegate members are on average more liberal 
than delegates in general attending the convention. Delegates active in the 
economic interest groups, by contrast, are at the party average. The anti­
abortionist group is the most conservative in the party and stands out in 
comparison with other social groups. Nonetheless, the anti-abortionists 
are conservative Democrats, not all that ideologically distinct, for exam­
ple, from Democrats who are active in farm groups. Thus, anti-abor­
tionists are still ideologically more in tune with the Democrats than with 
the Republicans.
A survey of the distribution of Republican ideological positions by 
groups (Table 6.8) indicates, first, that there is more homogeneity within 
the Republican party than the Democratic party. The Republican delegates 
taken as a whole are overwhelmingly conservative, falling between some­
what and very conservative in ideological self-placement. Only just over
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All Republicans 3.8 (388) 9 .0  (929) 46.6 (4802) 40.7 (4197)
Note: Percentages are row percentages.
13 percent of the delegates opt for either a somewhat liberal or moderate 
position. It should be recalled that membership in civil rights groups, 
women’s groups, and labor unions is found only among a quite small 
subset of Republican delegates. Such groups are a good deal more 
moderate in their ideological placement than are the other much larger 
econom ic groups within the Republican party. As among Democrats, the 
most conservative group found in the Republican ranks is the anti­
abortion group o f delegates; only about 5 percent see themselves as 
somewhat liberal or moderate, whereas just short of 60 percent view 
themselves as very conservative.
The social issues groups we have selected have failed to take form as 
major organizational forces in the Republican party in the same way as 
they have for the Democrats. Civil rights, women’s advocates, and en­
vironmental activists, are not potent forces in the Republican party The 
great exception is the anti-abortion group, the largest social issue group­
ing among the Republican delegates. Ideologically it is the most conser­
vative, and the least vigorously supportive of the party.
The configuration of ideological orientations on the one hand clearly
Table 6.9. Ideological Positions of Democratic group members
Women’s rights Ecologist Anti-abortionist Labor Business All delegates
Economic issues
Non-defense budget cuts - 2 3 .6 - 2 1 .7 +  0.3 - 9 .5 - 2 .4 - 6 .1
Wage and price controls - 7 . 6 -  1.3 - 8 .3 - 5 .8 - 2 .9 - 2 .1
Reduce inflation even if it 
increases unemployment - 6 .8 - 9 .9 - 4 .3 -  15.1 +  5.8 - 2 .6
Deregulate oil - 8 .4 -  14.2 - 5 .8 -  17.5 - 8 . 0 - 5 .1
More rapid development of 
nuclear power -2 8 .1 - 4 6 .0 -  10.4 - 7 .4 +  4.7 -  11.8
Social issues
Equal Rights Amendment -8 7 .5 -6 5 .3 +  3.7 - 2 8 .4 - 2 9 .9 - 4 0 .0
Anti-Abortion Amendment - 5 7 .0 - 4 7 .0 +  55.6 -  16.3 -  16.1 - 2 1 .0
Affirmative action - 3 9 .6 - 2 7 .4 +  6.5 - 2 2 .9 -  12.8 -  16.9
Foreign and defense issues
Reinstituting the draft -  17.4 - 2 4 .3 +  24.2 +  7.4 +  22.1 +  5.0
Ratification of Salt II - 2 3 .0 -  19.0 +  1.9 - 5 .4 - 2 .3 - 8 .5
Increased U .S. military presence 
in the Middle East - 9 .7 -  14.5 +  7.8 +  9.3 +  17.1 +  3.5
Note: Each entry is the percent strongly agreeing minus the percent strongly disagreeing with the issue.
distinguishes the several social and economic issue groups within the 
respective parties. On the other hand, clear cut ideological divisions exist 
between the two parties and their respective sets of social and economic
Our second hypothesis, which predicts that members of new issue 
groups would not show ideological congruence with their party, is thus 
unsupported. We can further explore the relative congruence between 
members of new interest groups and their parties by testing a third 
hypothesis, that members of the newer groups are less likely to share issue
ISSUE POSITIONS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP
There are sharp differences between the two parties on a whole range of 
issues, particularly questions of social policy The most outstanding 
difference is that Republicans are strongly unified on nearly every issue. 
Republicans have clear-cut, definite positions on most of the questions 
asked. In contrast, the Democrats exhibit very little unity on economic, 
defense, or foreign policy issues. The only area that reveals some issue 
consensus on the part of Democrats is that of social policy
It is a seeming paradox that the Democratic party, transformed into a 
majority party nearly forty years ago by the economic crisis of the 1930s, 
now seems to lack any sense of agreement on economic policy. In 
contrast, the Republicans (at least in the summer of 1980) exuded a great 
deal of confidence in their prescriptions for economic policy.
Our study of issue positions is reported in tables 6 .9  and 6.10. We 
employed a measure on policy position agreement that is used in 
Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick 1976, chapter 9). We have examined eleven 
issues: five in the area of economic policy, three social issues and three 
foreign and defense questions. Each score reported in the tables is the 
result of subtracting delegates who were strongly in favor of an issue 
position from those who were strongly opposed. A positive score should 
be interpreted as indicative of a conservative ideological position. A 
negative score should be understood as favoring a liberal position. An 
example is the proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit abortions 
except when the mother’s life is endangered. A conservative position is 
interpreted to mean the delegate favors the amendment. If a -I- 100 score is 
calculated for Republican delegates on this issue, then all Republicans
Table 6.10. Ideological Positions of Republican group members
Women’s rights Ecologist Anti-abortionist Labor Business All delegates
Economic issues
Non-defense budget cuts ^ +  28.8 +  34.5 ! + 4 7 .9 +  26.0 +  43.7 +  38.1
Wage and price controls +  28.0 +  37.2 7 + 4 4 .7 +  32.7 +  49.3 +  40.3
Reduce inflation even if it 
increases unemployment +  13.8 +  18.2 +  19.5 +  12.1 +  23.3 +  21.0
Deregulate oil +  25.6 +  35.3 +  40.2 +  24.2 +  45.1 +  37.5
More rapid development of 




- 2 4 .6 +  19.3 +  79.8 +  32.2 +  36.6 +  38.5
Anti-Abortion Amendment - 2 0 .5 +  9.6 ' + 7 7 .2 +  6.8 - 3 . 6 +  18.2
Affirmative action +  2.3 +  23.2 +  29.7 +  28.5 +  26.9 +  24.5
Foreign and defense issues 
Reinstituting the draft +  16.0 +  24.3 +  22.7 +  30.9 +  32.0 +  28.5
Ratification o f Salt II +  38.5 +  46.5 +  68.2 +  60.6 +  45.6 +  54.9
Increased U.S. military presence 
in the Middle East +  14.8 +  17.3 +  20.1 +  24.5 +  25.7 +  22.1
Note: Each entry is the percent strongly agreeing minus the percent strongly disagreeing with the issue.
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strongly favor such a constitutional amendment. A weakness in this 
scoring device is that a very low score could reflect cither a deeply divided 
party or a party with only a limited interest in the issue at hand.
Before examining the scores on issues by delegates active in interest 
groups, we will examine the respective issue stances of Republicans and 
Democrats in general in order to establish a comparative context for the 
analysis of the social and economic groups. First, for Democrats, it is 
apparent in Tabic 6.10 that none of the economic issues elicits consensus.
No clear-cut Democratic position emerges on such issues as the 
desirability of nondefense budget cuts, deregulation of oil, or wage and 
price controls. The lack of Democratic party unity on these issues may 
reflect the set of states available in the survey. But such disharmony is 
clearly not to be found among the Republicans drawn from the same 
states.
On economic issues, the Republicans hold very strong views. In Table 
6.10 there are remarkably high levels of support to deregulate oil, cut the 
budget, oppose wage and price controls, and fight inflation even at the 
expense of increased unemployment. Many of these proposals have, of 
course, been realized by the Reagan administration. On social issues, 
Republicans exhibit somewhat less unity, particularly if opposition to the 
Equal Rights Amendment is set aside. Some divisions do exist among the 
Republican delegates on abortion and affirmative action, but these divi­
sions are not large.
It is only on social issues that the Democrats reveal much party unity. 
The new social issues that made their way into the Democratic party in the 
1960s and the 1970s have clearly won for themselves a base of support 
extending beyond the delegates who are politically active in the new 
single issue groups. There is widespread support for the Equal Rights 
Amendment among Democrats. Indeed, it is the issue beyond all others 
that generates a party consensus. On two other highly divisive issues, we 
find the Democrats exhibiting more agreement in support of affirmative 
action and in opposition to a constitutional amendment outlawing abor­
tion than on all economic and foreign policy issues.
Foreign policy and defense issues fail to generate much unity or 
commitment among Democrats. There is little support among Democrats 
for ratification of SALT II even though the Carter administration had 
invested considerable time and political capital in the treaty. The issues of 
reinstituting the draft and increasing U .S . military presence in the Middle
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East do not elicit much commitment from Democratic delegates. In 
contrast, it is in opposition to the SALT II ratification that the highest 
issue agreement is reached among Republican delegates.
The Republican party consistently reveals consensus on the topical 
issues of the day. Such consensus may easily flow not only from the 
greater ideological unity of the Republican delegates, but from the under­
lying demographic homogeneity found in the Republican party. The 
Democrats are a far more diverse party, but as we have seen, it does not 
appear to be the social issues that are promoting divisions within the 
Democratic ranks.
To test our third hypothesis further, we have examined in more detail 
the policy attitudes of three single issue groups operating within each 
party— the anti-abortionists, advocates o f women’s rights, and environ­
mentalists.3 Our concern is to examine, first, how much the respective 
groups have in common that transcends party lines and, second, the extent 
to which delegates who are members of such groups indeed possess but a 
single interest. That is, do these delegates hold a general set of issue 
positions that places them within a well-defined segment of their respec­
tive political party or are these delegates in the party to realize their 
group’s goals alone?
In the case of the anti-abortionists and women’s rights groups, our 
survey included specific questions that capture the presumed central 
concerns of the group. These questions concerned the possible passage of 
the Equal Rights Amendment and an anti-abortion amendment to the 
Constitution. The question of more rapid development of nuclear power is 
not perhaps as central to environmentalists as the two issues described 
above. Nonetheless, it is an issue of deep concern to many environmen­
talist organizations in the nation and clearly distinguishes the Democratic 
activists with ecological concerns from other Democrats at the conven­
tions.
What observations can be made concerning single issue group politics 
and political party delegates on the basis o f Tables 6 .9  and 6.10? For 
certain issues central to the groups concerned, feminists and anti-abor­
tionists are clearly linked regardless of party. But this linkage in the case 
of women’s rights group activists is one of direction rather than one of 
intensity. The score for Democratic feminists on support for the Equal 
Rights Amendment is — 87.0; for Republican feminists it is — 24.6. The 
scores for their respective parties are: Democrats, —40; Republicans,
+  38. Republican feminists are certainly outside their party on this issue 
and are closer to Democratic delegates, but they are still quite distant from 
Democratic women’s rights group activists. On the broader range of 
issues, it is apparent that Republican feminists are on the left of their party, 
particularly on social policy issues, but their liberalism does not place 
them in the same ideological camp as women’s rights group activists in 
the Democratic party. What the two groups of activists share is that they 
are on the left of their respective parties, but the distance between the two 
groups is far greater than the distance between each group and their fellow 
party delegates.
Similarly, there is little congruity between Republican and Democratic 
environmentalists. This incongruity is quite apparent in attitudes toward 
the development of nuclear power. The support score for more rapid 
development of nuclear power is + 2 3 .8  for the Republican activists in 
environmentalist organizations. In contrast, the opposition among Demo­
cratic environmentalists is high for a score of —46.0. Thus Democratic 
environmentalists are firmly on the left and are remarkably similar in their 
issue positions to the supporters of women’s rights. Both feminists and 
environmentalists reveal a great deal of unity on social issues, particularly 
on the issue of nuclear power. Both groups are far more likely to oppose 
domestic budget cuts than are Democrats in general. The two groups are 
much more supportive of SALT II and far more in opposition to the draft 
than Democrats in general. The congruence in attitudes among members 
of these groups is not surprising in light of their overlapping mem­
berships, as 49 percent of Democrats claiming to be active in ecology  
groups are also active in women’s rights groups (see Table 6.3).
Republican environmentalists are for the most part very similar in the 
positions they hold to Republican delegates in general. It is only on the 
issues of equal rights and abortion that the environmentalists are less 
supportive of conservative positions. But on economic issues, there is 
virtually no difference between environmentalist Republican delegates 
and the rest of the party. Indeed, no particular sets of issue concerns 
appear to differentiate Republican environmentalists from the mainstream 
of Republican delegates.
It is with the anti-abortionists, the best known single interest group, 
that we find sharp differences in issue orientation from others in the party. 
Anti-abortionists are conservative, particularly on social issues, but also 
on foreign policy concerns as well. They cluster on the right in both
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parties. But as for the other sets of social issues groups, there remain 
substantial partisan differences between the two groups of anti-abor­
tionists. A good illustration is SALT II ratification, where Republican 
anti-abortionists vigorously oppose Senate consent. Democratic anti­
abortionists lack such unity. On economic questions, the Democratic anti­
abortionists are very similar to Democrats in general in that no strong 
pattern of issue positions is observable. Perhaps the most telling dif­
ference is on the Equal Rights Amendment: here the Republican anti­
abortionists are even more opposed to the ERA than they are in favor of an 
anti-abortion amendment, albeit only slightly. The same pattern is not 
duplicated for Democratic anti-abortionists who are too divided to have a 
unified vigorous stance one way or the other on the issue.
In short, the Democratic anti-abortionists are conservative Democrats. 
They are very distant from the ideological orientation held by Democratic 
environmentalists and women’s rights advocates, but they are removed 
from the Republican party as well. If pressed they might find the Republi­
cans more sympathetic on social issues and some defense issues, but still 
great gaps would remain that would ideologically separate them on many 
issues from their fellow anti-abortionists in the Republican party.
We have also examined the issue positions of two economic groups, 
business and labor, in the two parties. (See Tables 6.9  and 6 .10 .) There are 
some clear parallels with the pattern we found for the social issue groups. 
Both Republican and Democratic delegates who were active in business 
groups were consistently more conservative on economic issues than 
all the other groups described in this analysis as well as in comparison to 
the over-all averages of delegates in their respective parties. But it is also 
clear that Republican business delegates are consistently more conserva­
tive on economic issues than are Democratic delegates. The differences 
between the two sets of business group delegates are far greater than the 
differences between labor and business delegates within each of the two 
parties.
What is apparent in comparing labor and business group delegates 
within the Republican conventions is the remarkable unity on social 
issues. The only social question that generates any difference between the 
two Republican groups is the anti-abortion amendment where Republican 
business group activists express slight opposition. There are clear-cut 
differences between labor and business delegates on economic issues, 
with Republican business activists more conservative, but the differences 
are ones of magnitude.
Differences between labor and business activists in the Democratic 
Party are confined to economic issue areas. An illustration is that there is 
more support among Democratic business activists than labor activists for 
an anti-inflation policy that could cost jobs. On social issues a remarkable 
similarity between labor and business activists exists on the ERA and 
opposition to the anti-abortion amendment. There is some difference on 
support for affirmative action programs with labor activists being much 
more supportive. On foreign policy questions, Democratic labor activists 
and especially business activists are somewhat more conservative than 
Democratic delegates in general.
On the basis of our investigation, it is reasonable to conclude that in 
spite of the activities of interest groups, the political parties are still 
decidedly identifiable bodies possessing a high degree of loyalty and 
varying degrees of ideological unity.
The Democrats are the more deeply divided party. There are divisions 
between liberals and moderates and little unity is manifested on a range of 
topical issues. Party support is lower than that found in the Republican 
party. Democrats, confronted with a large number of diverse and active 
interest groups, may simply be much less of a definable political entity 
than Republicans. Where there is some semblance of commitment and 
consensus in the Democratic party, however, it is in the area of social 
issues. Here, deeply controversial issue positions have achieved a level of 
delegate support not reflected in either economic or foreign policy issues. 
In reference to the Democratic party the first hypothesis is partially 
confirmed, as support for the party is stronger among the older established 
economic groups. These economic groups are also more in the main­
stream of the party ideologically— more so than most of the single issue 
groups who occupy a liberal position in the party.
In the Republican party the need to modify the hypothesis is more 
evident. The position a group enjoys in the party clearly influences the 
group’s level of party support. Many of the newer social groups, as well as 
labor, have not enjoyed much support among Republicans. In turn, such 
groups are the least supportive of the party. In addition to sheer numbers, 
it is likely that multiple group memberships enhance the group’s oppor­
tunity to have its issue position disseminated throughout the party. The 
greater the number of delegates who are members of business groups, the 
greater the ease of generating probusiness sympathies. The greater the 
extent of plural membership, the greater the likelihood of mutual appreci­
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ation of issue concerns and of coalitions built on such common concerns.
It is the anti-abortionist movement that presents the most obvious test 
for hypotheses concerning the extent of party loyalty found in a single 
issue group. Like nearly all other groups, the group has had a differential 
impact on the two parties. It has much less representation among Demo­
cratic delegates than the other social issue groups. It is a movement that is 
ideologically on the right of the Democratic party, but still anti-abortionist 
delegates have more in common with other Democrats than they do with 
Republican anti-abortionists. The Republican anti-abortionist movement 
among Republican delegates is relatively large and ideologically consis­
tently to the right of any other group in the party. Like the other social 
issue groups in the Republican party, it is less willing to support the party 
than are delegates in general. The anti-abortionist movement is very much 
still in the process of establishing itself and, if the examples of social 
issues in the Democratic party give us guidance, we would predict that the 
anti-abortionists would gain in influence in the Republican party and 
diminish in strength among the Democrats. Social issues seem to follow a 
zero-sum course of partisan distribution not unlike the issue itself. If one 
party supports the issue, then the other party ultimately will not. In 
contrast, economic groups with the exception of labor have a good deal 
more flexibility in surviving in and accommodating to both parties. The 
challenge to parties is not the rise of single issue groups, but sorting out 
the process by which issue groups find their respective ideological homes.
' ’ ' ; " ' ' ' IV V' ‘ ‘ NOTES ' ' ' ‘ "
1. Discussion of single issue groups is not new to American politics. The 
abolitionists and the suffragettes are examples of powerful nineteenth-century 
movements. In the current debate more attention has focused on the effective 
communication strategies of the New Right social issues groups.
2. A subjective measure of party support (question 5 in the appendix) has been 
selected rather than objective measures such as attendance at party functions or 
activities undertaken in behalf of party candidates. The subjective approach is 
justified on the basis that the delegates surveyed form an elite within the party and 
are capable of making such judgments.
3. These groups were chosen because they have arisen in the past ten to fifteen 
years.
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